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Abstract
In this study, I estimate the effects that mothers' experience of negative economic shocks
during pregnancy or shortly after childbirth has on children's subjective and objective health
measures in Malawi. Using data from the Malawi Longitudinal Study on Families and Health
(MLSFH), I find that children whose mothers were hit by such economic shocks were about
7 percentage points less likely to be reported to be in excellent health and 8 percentage points
less likely to be reported to be in much better health compared to children of the same age and
sex in the same village by their mothers. They were also about 300 grams lighter and 0.3
centimeters shorter than others, although the latter estimate is relatively imprecise and not
statistically significant at conventional significance levels. These results are robust to various
econometric specifications and sample selection rules. In addition, I propose a simple model
to account for the fact that economic shocks are self-reported and show that my results are
likely to continue to hold under reasonable assumptions about the rates of false positive and
false negative reports of these economic shocks.
Keywords: Economic shocks, Child health, Malawi, Sub-Saharan Africa
JEL: I10, J13, C21
1 Introduction
There has been a strong and long-standing interest in social sciences in the production function
of infant health, as it has been shown to be critical for the development of health and human
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capital more broadly throughout the entire life-cycle (Aizer and Currie 2014, Almond et al.
2017, Barker 1990, Bhalotra and Rawlings 2013, Case and Paxson 2008a,b, 2009, 2010, Case et
al. 2005, Currie 2011, Currie and Almond 2011, Currie and Moretti 2007, Currie and Vogl 2013,
Currie et al. 2018, Grossman 1972, Heckman 2006, Nandi et al. 2017, Rosenzweig and Schultz
1982)1. As a result, understanding the determinants of infant health, particularly at the very
beginning of life, is crucial for any theories and policies addressing the development of human
capital throughout the life course.
Studies have shown that mothers' socio-demographic characteristics, such as their education,
income, employment, as well as their health care use and health behaviors such as cigarette
smoking and alcohol consumption, are all important inputs that enter into the infant health
production function (Corman et al. 2017). A growing and more recent literature in economics
has focused on the importance of in utero stress experienced by mothers, which has been shown
to have important negative effects on infant health (Corman et al. 2017, Currie et al. 2018).
Among all of these different forms of exposure to stress, malnutrition in utero and during
very early life due to irregular food intakes and lack of nutrients is particularly detrimental to
children's health and development (Almond and Mazumder 2011, Almond et al. 2015, Barker
1995, Lavy et al. 2016, Nandi et al. 2017, Neelsen and Stratmann 2011, Schultz-Nielsen et al.
2016). Indeed, it is now well-documented that nutritional deprivation in formative years can have
permanent effects on body-size in adulthood (Barker 1998, Coly et al. 2006, De Onis and Branca
2016, Glewwe et al. 2001, Martorell 1999), risks of chronic diseases (Huxley et al. 2000, Whincup
et al. 2008), cognitive development (Hoddinott et al. 2013) and socio-economic outcomes (Currie
and Vogl 2013, Hoddinott et al. 2013, Martorell et al. 2009, WHO 1995).
Malnutrition can be triggered by many factors, among which lack of disposable income is
perhaps the most important (Sen 1982). Economic shocks occurring in utero or early in life can
be particularly damaging for infants whose mothers live in vulnerable environments with very
limited resources. Indeed, mothers can find themselves trapped in critical situations in which the
only way they can cope with the consequences of economic shocks is to adjust their diet or the
ones of their newborns. This is especially true in regions of extreme poverty with non-existent
or weak public safety nets. In Sub-Sahara African countries, for example, any shocks that affect
the economic situation of pregnant women or mothers can have devastating effects on the health
of their children if they are forced to reduce their infant's food quality and food intakes or cease
1See Prinz et al. (2018) for a review.
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breastfeeding earlier than recommended (Joanna Briggs et al. 2012)2.
While evidence of the importance of economic shocks during pregnancy or at birth on infant
health is well known in developed countries (Banerjee et al. 2010, Carlson 2015, Rohde et al.
2017, Van den Berg et al. 2006), corresponding evidence in developing countries is more scarce
(Currie and Vogl 2013).
Using a month-long blackout in Zanzibar3 as a negative transitory income shock, Burlando
(2014) finds that children exposed in utero to the electric power outage were about 150 grams
lighter at birth compared to those who were not exposed to the shock. Maccini and Yang (2009)
find that women who were exposed to positive income shock (measured in terms of unexpected
positive rainfall shock) during the year of their birth in Indonesia were in better self-rated health
and were taller than others, by about half a centimeter, when they were adults. Bozzoli and
Quintana-Domeque (2014) document a decrease in birth weight of about 30 grams for children
born from mothers who were subject to macroeconomic fluctuation following the Argentinian
economic crisis early in 2000s. Similarly, Paxson and Schady (2005) find that the economic crisis
in Peru resulted in an increase of about 2.5 percentage point in infant mortality rate for children
born during the crisis of the late 1980s.
While evidence suggests that negative (positive) economic shocks during pregnancy or shortly
after birth negatively (positively) affect infant health, the nature of the shocks in some of these
studies in developing countries raises concerns about the generalizability of their findings (Mac-
cini and Yang 2009). While lack of and excess rainfall are likely to be the most common type of
shocks in rural regions in developing countries (Adhvaryu et al. 2018, Dinkelman 2013), other
shocks like severe economic crises and blackouts, although interesting in their own, might happen
relatively infrequently and be very specific to the local situation. The effects of these particular
shocks could therefore raise concern about generalizability because of the very specific subpop-
ulations these effects are estimated for, calling into question the relevance of the findings.
In this study, I estimate the effects that negative economic shocks experienced by mothers
while pregnant or shortly after giving birth have on subjective and objective health measures for
children in Malawi. Malawi is a Sub-Saharan country located in East central Africa and is one of
the world's poorest countries. With about 70% of its population living below the international
2Economic shocks could for instance increase the opportunity cost of breastfeeding through their effects on
labor demand (Thai et al. 2012).
3The blackout was due to an accidental break in the undersea cable that connects Zanzibar with the electricity
generators on mainland Tanzania.
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poverty line in 2016 ($1.90 per person per day) (International Monetary Fund 2017), Malawi is a
country where poverty is deep and wide. Poverty is particularly high in rural areas where about
85% of the population lives (Orr et al. 2001), most of them in small farms. As a rural country
with a mostly agricultural economy, poverty is closely linked to malnutrition, food insecurity
and famine (Devereux 1999, Orr et al. 2001)4. Children are often the collateral victims of these
economic shocks in Malawi, one reason being that dietary adjustments are the principal coping
strategies in cases of economic difficulties (Devereux 1999)5. Although child malnutrition is
on the decline, the prevalence of stunting among children under five in Malawi is still at 37%
(International Monetary Fund 2017), one of the highest rate in the world (De Onis and Branca
2016).
I investigate the consequences of negative economic shocks at birth on two sets of health out-
comes. The first set of outcomes represents measures of subjective health of children as reported
by their mother. The second set of outcome variables represents anthropometric measures of
these children (weight and height) which are directly associated with malnutrition. Anthropo-
metric outcomes such as weight and height are widely used as health indicators for assessing
the adequacy of nutrition and growth in infancy (Currie and Vogl 2013, Fishman et al. 2004,
Thomas and Strauss 1992, Thomas et al. 1990, WHO 1995) and have been shown to be related
to infant survival (Chen et al. 1980, Fishman et al. 2004), skill development and productivity
later in life (Cravioto and Arrieta 1986).
Using data from the Malawian Longitudinal Study of Family and Health (MLSFH), I find
that children whose mothers experience economic shocks during the year of their birth are about
7 percentage points less likely to be in excellent health and 8 percentage points less likely to be in
much better health as compared to children of the same age and sex in the same village. I show
that in addition to having statistically significant effects on these subjective health measures,
negative economic shocks also have substantial effects on objective health measures. I find that
children who are born during the year when their mothers experience economic shocks were
about 300 grams lighter and 0.3 centimeters shorter than others. These effects are large and
are robust to the inclusion of various economic specifications and sample selections. I show
that mothers who are able to draw financial and in-kind help from their social network are
4In 2013, 84% of individuals living in rural households experienced food insecurity for at least one month per
year (International Monetary Fund 2017).
5In a survey of 104 household conducted in Zamba district in the South of Malawi, Devereux (1999) found
that 74% of rural households reported eating only one meal per day in the hungry season usually from December
to April.
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able to buffer the negative effects of these shocks on children health while mothers with limited
access to such help are not able to do so. Overall, these results suggest that mothers have
difficulty maintaining their own and their children's nutritional intake when hit by economic
shocks, hindering the normal development of their infants.
2 Data source and sample selection
The analysis is based on the Malawian Longitudinal Study of Family and Health (MLSFH), a
panel survey collected of rural households in Malawi almost every two years since 1998. Orig-
inally established to study the influence of social network on fertility behaviors and HIV risk
perceptions, the scope of the MLSFH has since then greatly expanded and provides now very
detailed information on demographic and socio-economic characteristics, family structure, social
network and social capital, intergenerational relations as well as health conditions of about 4,000
people living in three rural regions of Malawi (Kohler et al. 2014): Rumphi in the north, Mchinji
in the centre and Balaka in the south. While not designed to be representative of rural Malawi,
the sample characteristics of the MLSFH has been found to match those of the Demography
and Health Survey (DHS), which is representative of the rural population in Malawi (Anglewicz
et al. 2009).
My study uses the fifth wave of data collection of 2008. Among the now ten waves of data
that have been collected to date, wave 5 is the only one that includes anthropometric measures
of children, which I use to derive objective measures of child health status.
The results for subjective health measures are based on a sample of 1784 children who were
born between 2003 and 2008, which I will refer to as the "subjective health sample". Only
a subset of them participated in the anthropometric measurements module. The sample from
which I derive my results on objective health measures is therefore smaller, consisting of 789
children, which I will call the "anthropometric sample".
2.1 Outcome variables
2.1.1 Subjective measures of health
From the family roster of the MLSFH survey wave 5, I derive six binary outcome variables from
three questions asking mothers to evaluate the health of their children.
The first question asks mothers whether their child has been ill in the past 12 months and
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if yes, for how long. Possible answers to the question were "no", "yes, for less than a month",
"yes, for 1 to 3 months", "yes, for 3 to 6 months", "yes, for 6 months or longer" and "don't
know". I derived two binary variables from this question, one that takes the value 1 if the child
has been ill over the past 12 months and 0 otherwise, and another that takes the value 1 if the
child has been ill for at least 1 month and 0 otherwise. Panel A of Table 1 shows that 59% of
the children in my sample were ill at some point during the year preceding the interview and
6% of them were ill for at least 1 month.
The next two binary variables are derived from the second question, which asks mothers to
rate the health of their child in general. Based on a Likert scale measure ranging from "excellent"
to "very poor", I derive a binary variable that takes the value 1 if they considered the health of
their child as being very good or better and 0 otherwise, and another indicator that takes the
value 1 if the health of the child was considered as being excellent and 0 otherwise. Panel A of
Table 1 shows that a large share of the 1784 children in my sample were reported to be at least
in very good health (75%) and in excellent health (38%), respectively.
My last two outcome variables are derived from a third question in which the mothers are
asked to compare the health of their child to other children of the same age and sex in the
village. The first variable derived from this question takes the value 1 if the mothers considered
their child to be in better health as compared to other children of the same age and sex in the
village and 0 otherwise, and the second takes the value 1 if they considered the health of their
child to be much better than other children of the same age and sex and 0 otherwise. Table
1 shows that the subjective assessment of the mothers regarding the health of their children is
very high, with 65% of the mothers saying that their child is in better health and 34% of them
saying that they are in much better health than others.
Columns 5 and 7 of Table 1 show that on average, children who have experienced a shock
at birth have lower subjective health measures as compared to those who have not experienced
these shocks. While purely associative, these differences are already suggestive regarding the
possible negative effects of economic shocks at birth on children's health.
Because all the binary outcome variables derived above are subjective, I complement my
analysis by also using anthropometric measures of the children in my sample to estimate the
effects of negative economic shocks at birth on objective child health measures.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the subjective health sample (Panel A) and anthropometric sample (Panel
B)
All sample Shock at birth No shock at birth
Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Mean Std
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Subjective health sample
Ill over the past 12 months .59 .49 0 1 .63 .48 .57 .49
Ill for more than 1 month .06 .24 0 1 .08 .27 .06 .23
Very good health .75 .43 0 1 .73 .44 .76 .43
Excellent health .38 .49 0 1 .34 .47 .40 .49
Better health than others .65 .48 0 1 .62 .48 .66 .47
Much better health than others .34 .47 0 1 .30 .46 .35 .48
Economic shock at birth .27 .44 0 1 1 0
Female .50 .50 0 1 .51 .50 .50 .50
Age 2.60 1.67 0 5 1.87 1.36 2.87 1.70
Age of the mother at birth 27.09 7.31 11 50 27.14 7.21 27.07 7.35
Obs. 1784
B. Anthropometric sample
Weight (in kg) 11.41 3.46 2 23 9.81 3.02 12.08 3.42
Height (in cm) 81.58 13.59 43 145 74.96 11.75 84.39 13.34
Economic shock at birth .30 .46 0 1 1 0 0 0
Female .53 .50 0 1 .53 .50 .53 .50
Age 2.44 1.47 0 5 1.63 1.17 2.78 1.45
Age of the mother at birth 27.10 7.51 15 50 27.55 7.72 26.91 7.41
Obs. 789
Note: Sample derived from the MLSFH data wave 5. Descriptive statistics of children of the respondents born
between 2003 and 2008.
2.1.2 Objective measures of health - Anthropometrics
From the anthropometric module of wave 5, I derive several objective outcome variables to
determine the health status of the children in the study. First, I determine the effects of negative
economic shocks on weight in kilograms (kg) and height (length) in centimeters (cm)6.
On the one hand, child weight has been shown to be correlated with infant prospects for
survival (Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982, Susser et al. 1972) as well as with the prevalence of several
infectious diseases such as pneumonia, diarrhoea and malaria (Fishman et al. 2004). Being
underweight as a child is also linked to impaired cognitive development, intellectual deficits
and poor school performance and is associated with increased risk of chronic diseases later
in life, functional impairment and reduced work capacity (Fishman et al. 2004). Height, on
the other hand, is a good proxy for exposure to disease and deprivation typically experienced
within the first three years of life (Beach et al. 2018, Currie and Vogl 2013, Parman 2015,
Thomas et al. 1990, WHO 1995). In general, abnormal anthropometric measurements can have
6Note that these measures were collected by trained interviewers following strict protocols and were not
self-reported. I use height to refer to both length, measured in recumbent position, and stature, measured in
standing position. In all regressions in which height is the outcome variable, I control for whether the height of
the child was measured in a recumbent or standing position.
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significant short- and long-term health consequences such as an increase in incidence and severity
of morbidity, mortality, poor psychological and intellectual development (WHO 1995) and are
strong indicators of malnutrition.
Panel B of Table 1 shows that on average, children in my sample weight about 11kg (first
row) and are about 82cm tall (second row). Again, comparing these measures between children
who experienced economic shocks at birth and those who did not (Column 5 and 7), one can
see a large difference between the two groups, which may potentially suggest important effects
of these economic shocks on child health. It is worth mentioning here that the substantial
difference in these two groups are mainly due to age difference. Indeed, as shown in the fifth row
of Panel B of Table 1, children who experienced a shock at birth are on average 1.6 years old
whereas those who did not are 2.8 years old. These differences in age in both samples are due
to the structure of the questionnaire. That is, respondents are more likely to report shocks that
were experienced in recent years and, given that I am matching these shocks to children born
between 2003 and 2008, children with economic shocks at birth will be by construction younger
than others. In the analysis that follows, I will include age in year dummies in all my models to
ensure that I am estimating the effects of economic shocks on child health for a given age.
2.2 Economic shocks
The 2008 questionnaire includes an economic shock module in which respondents are asked
whether their households have faced any negative economic shocks over the last five years and
if so, during which years the shocks occurred, and their impact on the community in which they
live7.
More specifically, the question is: "Over the past five years, was your household severely
affected negatively by any of the following unexpected events or crises?", where the proposed
unexpected shocks were listed as follows: "Death or serious illness of an adult member or someone
who provides support for yourself or your family", "Poor crop yields, loss of crops due to disease
or pests, or loss of livestock due to theft or disease, or loss of coupon", "Loss of source of income-
such as loss of employment, business failure, someone who had been assisting the household
stopped their support", "Big change in price of grain (either increase or decrease)", "Breakup of
household, such as a divorce", "Damage to house due to fire, flood, or other unexpected event" or
7Note that questions related to economic shocks were asked after the questions about children's health. This
should minimize the potential concern of ex-post rationalization that could influence mothers' evaluation of the
health of their children.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the negative economics shocks in both samples
Subjective health sample Anthropometric sample
Count % Count %
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Obs. 1784 789
Economic shock at birth 473 .27 235 .30
Idiosycratic shocks 189 .40 99 .42
Common shocks 329 .70 163 .69
Death or serious illness 125 .26 65 .28
Poor crop yields or loss due to disease/pests 197 .42 105 .45
Loss of source of income 74 .16 38 .16
Big change in price of grain 146 .31 79 .34
Breakup of household 32 .07 17 .07
Damage to house due to fire, flood etc 22 .05 15 .06
Other shocks 2 .00 2 .01
Note: Sample derived from the MLSFH data wave 5. Idiosyncratic shocks are shocks affecting the respondent's
household only. Common shocks are shocks affecting other households as well. The first two columns represent
the count and % of shocks in my subjective health sample and the last two represent the same statistics for my
anthropometric sample. It is worth noting that children can experience several shocks during their year of birth.
any shock respondents could specify. Moreover, for the three most important shocks that they
have experienced over the past five years, respondents are asked when (calendar year) these
shocks occurred and whether these shocks affected "only the household", "other households as
well", "most households in the community" or "all households in the community".
In my analysis, each unit of observation is a child. Given that I know the year of birth of
each child and the year when economic shocks occur, I can match these self-reported shocks
to the year of birth of each child. More specifically, my self-reported economic shock variable
takes the value 1 if the mother experienced a negative economic shock the year when her child
was born and 0 otherwise. The limitation of this analysis is that these economic shocks are
self-reported. As will be detailed in Section 6, errors in self-reported shocks are likely to bias
my estimated effects. I discuss this issue at length below, where I propose two different ways to
assess the robustness of my findings to economic shock misreports.
Table 2 describes the shocks that children in my two samples have been exposed to in utero or
during the year of birth. Out of the 1784 children in my subjective health sample, 473 were born
in a year when their mother experienced a negative economic shock (about 27%), which shows
how prevalent and widespread economic instability is in these low income and rural regions of
Malawi. About 70% of these shocks were "common shocks" in the sense that they affected not
only the household of the respondent but also other households, and 40% of these shocks were
"idiosyncratic" in the sense that they impacted the household of the respondent only. When
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breaking down these shocks by categories, "Poor crop yields or loss due to disease/pests" and
"Big change in price of grain" were the two most common shocks, representing about 42% and
31% of the shocks, respectively. When looking at my anthropometric sample (Columns 3 and
4), one can see that the rate of occurrence of these shocks and the percentage of these shocks
are very similar to the subjective health sample.
2.3 Control variables
Some characteristics of the mothers, if not controlled for, could result in omitted variable bias
in my attempt to estimate the effects of economic shocks on child health. Indeed, any variables
that are not controlled for and are correlated with both my assumed exogenous and self-reported
economic shock and my dependent variables would jeopardize the causal interpretation of my
estimates. For this reason, I control for a wide set of mother characteristics. For instance, wealth
of the respondents is likely to be correlated with the probability of experiencing (and reporting)
a negative economic shock and with child health. For this reason I include as independent
variable a continuous wealth index based on a set of 20 dwelling characteristics and ownership of
household durable assets constructed using first principal component analysis (Chin 2010, Filmer
and Pritchett 1998, Hyder et al. 2015, Vyas and Kumaranayake 2006)8. In addition to wealth,
my analysis also controls for various factors that could influence both self-reported negative
economic shock and child health such as the region where the mother lives, the ethnicity and the
level of education of the mother, which proxies for unobserved family background characteristics
(Behrman and Wolfe 1987, Thomas et al. 1990), the value of the crops that the household
has produced during the last growing season, the total household expenditure on various items
(clothes, fabric, shoes, medical expenses, fertilizer, seeds, hired labor, agricultural tools and
equipment and expenses related to funerals, all at the household level) and the amount the
household has spent for its children over the three months prior to the interview9. The sex and
age of the child, the age of the mother at the time of the child birth and the child's birth order
are also controlled for.
Table 1 shows that about half of the children in my subjective and objective samples are
8Wealth measures based on household asset ownership are usually used to control for stable household wealth
characteristics (Behrman and Knowles 1999, Thomas and Strauss 1992). Because wealth can potentially be
directly related to the (previous) experience of economic shocks, I use as robustness check past wealth measures
instead of the current one (in 2008) to control for initial wealth levels that could mitigate the damaging effects
of negative shocks. I show that my results are robust to various specifications of wealth measure variables.
9Household expenditure is usually considered as a better measure of long-run resources availability than total
income, especially in rural communities where income is variable (Thomas and Strauss 1992, Thomas et al. 1990).
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girls and the average age of the children at the interview is about 2.5 years old. As shown in
this table, the average age of the mothers at child birth in the two samples is very similar and
equal to 27.1 years old.
3 Method
Multivariable linear regressions are conducted to estimate the effects of negative economic shocks
experienced by mothers during the year they gave birth on the various subjective and objective
measures of child health10. More specifically, I estimate the following model:
Hi = α0 + α1S∗i +X ′iα2 + νi (1)
where Hi is the subjective or objective health measures of child i in 2008, S∗i is a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if the mother of i has experienced a negative economic shock
during the year of i's birth and X ′i is a set of control variables. Because of the size of my
sample, I sequentially add more controls in my specification and investigate the stability of my
estimates. In my benchmark specification, X ′i includes a set of child age dummies, the age
of the mother at child birth as well as the sex of the child (set 1). Set 2 includes set 1 as
well as mothers' socio-economic characteristics that are relatively stable over time and are less
likely to be affected by economic shocks. More specifically, set 2 adds the marital status of the
mother, her level of education (dummies for none, primary and secondary level of education), the
component analysis-based continuous wealth score as well as the birth order of the child11. Set 3,
in addition to the controls in set 2, includes variables that can possibly be affected by economic
shocks and mediate the relationship between these shocks and child health. Set 3 includes the
total value of the household crop production over the last growing season (in deciles), the total
household expenditure and the total household expenditure on children in the three months prior
to the interview, both also in deciles. In addition to these variables, all my regressions include
ethnicity and region dummies to control for any systematic differences in these three regions.
The samples I use to derive my results on subjective (objective) measures of health consist of
10I also provide estimates derived from Logit and Probit models when the outcome variables under consider-
ation are binary.
11Note that I use the most up-to-date information available at the year of birth to define these variables. In
other words, information collected in wave 5 (2008), wave 4 (2006) and wave 3 (2004) was used to define these
variables for children born in 2007-2008, 2005-2006 and 2003-2004, respectively. If information was missing in
some waves, I use the most recent information available.
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1784 (789) children from 1153 (589) different mothers12. In all the results below, standard errors
are clustered at the mother level.
4 Results
4.1 Subjective outcomes
Table 3 summarizes the effects of negative economic shocks on the subjective health measures
of the children in my sample. Columns 1, 2 and 3 represent these effects when the set of control
variables 1, 2 and 3 are used, respectively. The first two rows show that experiencing an economic
shock in utero or early in life increases the probability of being ill later in life, although these
effects are small and relatively imprecisely estimated. Rows 3 and 4 show that economic shocks
reduce the probability of being in very good and excellent health by about 4 percentage points
and 7 percentage points, respectively. The effects on the probability of being on excellent health
is statistically significant at the 95%-level whereas the effects on very good health fail to be
significant at conventional levels. The negative effects of economic shocks can also be seen when
mothers are asked to evaluate the health of their child as compared to children of the same age
and sex in the village. Children born in the year when an economic shock occurs are less likely to
be in better and much better health than their counterparts. The latter effect is large and highly
significant: children who experienced a shock in utero or in the year of birth are 8% points less
likely to be in much better health than others. When looking at these effects separately for boys
and girls (Columns 4 and 5), one can see that the effects are rather similar, although they are
more pronounced and precisely estimated for boys. This finding is consistent with the literature
about the fragility of boys in the beginning of life (Kraemer 2000). Corresponding results using
Logit and Probit models instead of linear probability models are presented in Tables A.1 and
A.2 of the Online Appendix A. The marginal effects presented in these two tables are very close
to those obtained in Table 3.
The above provides first preliminary evidence of the negative effects of economic shocks
experienced in utero or at birth on child health later in life. That being said, these results are
based on subjective measures and might therefore be biased because of reporting heterogeneity.
Exploiting my relatively large subjective health sample and the fact that I observe several
12Note that I dropped 4 outliers in my objective measure sample: these four children were reported to be 103,
99, 48 and 33 centimeters tall at age 0, 0, 3 and 4, respectively. Including them in my analysis however does not
significantly affect the results of my estimates.
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Table 3: Effects of negative economic shocks at birth on subjective health outcomes
- linear probability model
Probability of being: Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Boy Girl
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ill in the last 12 months .010 .021 .019 .005 .034
(.028) (.032) (.032) (.045) (.045)
ill for more than 1 month .016 .016 .015 .019 .012
(.014) (.016) (.016) (.024) (.023)
in very good health -.016 -.037 -.036 -.034 -.048
(.026) (.030) (.030) (.040) (.043)
in excellent health -.033 -.069∗∗ -.073∗∗ -.097∗∗ -.058
(.027) (.030) (.030) (.044) (.044)
in better health -.029 -.059∗ -.054∗ -.066 -.045
(.028) (.032) (.032) (.044) (.047)
in much better health -.033 -.081∗∗∗ -.080∗∗∗ -.114∗∗∗ -.060
(.027) (.029) (.029) (.041) (.043)
Obs. 1784 1384 1382 700 682
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Effects of negative economic shocks during the year of birth
on subjective health outcomes. Columns 1, 2 and 3 include set of controls 1, 2 and 3,
respectively. Columns 4 and 5 include the same controls as Column 3. Estimates of the
other coefficients are available upon request.
children per mother in some cases, I can add mother fixed effects in the analysis to control for
unobserved mother characteristics that are constant across births such as potential time-invariant
effects, including reporting heterogeneity. Table B.1 in the Online Appendix B shows that my
results are robust to the inclusion of mother fixed effects to capture unobserved attributes
of mothers and/or households that could be correlated with both child health and economic
shocks13.
The results so far present some important evidence of the negative effects that economic
shocks experienced at birth have on subjective child health outcomes. I now focus my analysis
on objective measures of child health.
13The same appendix presents the fixed-effect logit analog to the previous linear fixed-effect analysis. Results
in Table B.2 are again very consistent to the ones obtained in the linear fixed-effect analysis.
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4.2 Objective health measures
4.2.1 Main results
Table 4 shows the effects of economic shocks experienced in utero or during the year of birth on
children's weight. Again, Columns 1, 2 and 3 include the set of controls 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
One can see in the first row that these shocks have a strong and statistically significant effect on
the weight of the children in my sample. Experiencing such a shock decreases children's weight
by about 330 grams. These effects are particularly robust to the inclusion of additional control
variables in Columns 2 and 3. Looking at the other control variables included in my models,
one can see that, not surprisingly, weight increases with age and girls are lighter than boys.
The age of the mother at birth increases the weight of the children by about 30 grams, which
is consistent with previous studies (Bakker et al. 2011, MacLeod and Kiely 1988). Again, when
estimating the models by sex (Columns 4 and 5), one can see that the economic shocks have
more damaging effects on boys than on girls (549 grams lighter for boys compared to 123 grams
for girls). This suggests the absence of gender bias towards male (Maccini and Yang 2009) and
is consistent with the fact that boys are more prone to being underweight, stunted and suffering
from wasting early in life (De Onis et al. 1997).
Table 5 presents the same set of estimates but looks at height instead of weight. One can
see that economic shocks experienced in utero or during the year of birth reduced the height of
the children by about 0.3 centimeters (depending on the set of controls) but these effects fail to
be significant. As was the case in the subjective measures of health and weight, boys appear
to be more affected by these shocks, although in the case of height, the effect is not precisely
estimated.
These estimates control for wealth level in 2008. Because wealth level could potentially be
affected by economic shocks, I assess the robustness of my results in defining wealth level as
the level prior to the birth of the child. Table C.1 in the Online Appendix C shows that using
household wealth level in 2004, which is prior to most of the births in my sample, does not affect
my estimates substantively.
Moreover, the analysis above focuses on the average effects of economic shocks in utero or at
birth on children's weight and height. It could however be interesting to know where in the weight
and height distributions these effects are taking place. To do so, I compute weight-for-age and
height-for-age z-scores and estimate the effects of economic shocks on the probability of being d
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Table 4: Effects of negative economic shocks at birth on weight
(1) (2) (3)
Male
(4)
Female
(5)
Economic shock at birth -0.336∗∗ -0.325∗ -0.353∗∗ -0.549∗∗ -0.123
(0.164) (0.173) (0.175) (0.253) (0.207)
Age of child = 1 3.103∗∗∗ 3.107∗∗∗ 3.140∗∗∗ 3.421∗∗∗ 2.655∗∗∗
(0.242) (0.255) (0.257) (0.390) (0.295)
Age of child = 2 4.510∗∗∗ 4.589∗∗∗ 4.608∗∗∗ 4.792∗∗∗ 4.154∗∗∗
(0.243) (0.259) (0.263) (0.402) (0.296)
Age of child = 3 6.736∗∗∗ 6.819∗∗∗ 6.868∗∗∗ 6.735∗∗∗ 6.679∗∗∗
(0.262) (0.291) (0.292) (0.428) (0.322)
Age of child = 4 8.521∗∗∗ 8.631∗∗∗ 8.619∗∗∗ 8.818∗∗∗ 8.159∗∗∗
(0.232) (0.268) (0.272) (0.387) (0.290)
Age of child = 5 9.426∗∗∗ 9.582∗∗∗ 9.664∗∗∗ 8.763∗∗∗ 9.833∗∗∗
(0.355) (0.463) (0.459) (0.562) (0.465)
Age of mother at birth 0.030∗∗∗ 0.031∗ 0.030∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.023∗
(0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.014) (0.012)
Female -0.501∗∗∗ -0.590∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.157) (0.156)
Mother married at birth 0.046 0.047
(0.350) (0.352)
Primary level of education -0.133 -0.167
(0.219) (0.216)
Secondary level of education -0.274 -0.258
(0.443) (0.454)
Wealth score -0.064 -0.061
(0.054) (0.058)
Birth order -0.013 -0.047
(0.064) (0.065)
Total value of crop production (10 quantiles) -0.011
(0.037)
Total expenditure of HH (10 quantiles) -0.127∗
(0.066)
Total expenditure on children (10 quantiles) 0.179∗∗
(0.072)
Constant 5.330∗∗∗ 5.905∗∗∗ 5.779∗∗∗ 4.639∗∗∗ 5.154∗∗∗
(0.509) (0.705) (0.725) (0.828) (0.591)
Observations 789 639 639 372 417
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Effects of
negative economic shocks during the year of birth on weight. Columns 1, 2 and 3 include set of controls 1, 2 and
3, respectively. Columns 4 and 5 include the same controls as Column 1. The reference category is a boy of age 0
from the central region of Malawi who did not experience any economic shock at birth.
standard deviations away from the sex- and age-specific median, with d = {−2,−1,1,2}, as well as
the probability of being lower than the median (d = 0). Results in the Online Appendix D show
that these effects appear to be quite homogeneous along the weight and height distributions and
that potentially all children are affected by these shocks.
In sum, children whose mothers experience a negative economic shock during pregnancy or
the year of childbirth are significantly less likely to be in excellent health and to be in much
better health than similar children in the village who are of the same age and sex. When it
comes to objective measures of health, these children were about 300 grams lighter than others
and about 0.3 centimeters shorter. I now further investigate the robustness of these findings and
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Table 5: Effects of negative economic shocks at birth on height
(1) (2) (3)
Male
(4)
Female
(5)
Economic shock at birth -0.705 -0.355 -0.356 -1.257 -0.152
(0.539) (0.583) (0.588) (0.799) (0.740)
Age of child = 1 13.395∗∗∗ 13.155∗∗∗ 13.171∗∗∗ 14.010∗∗∗ 12.567∗∗∗
(0.794) (0.822) (0.825) (1.155) (1.180)
Age of child = 2 20.862∗∗∗ 21.278∗∗∗ 21.292∗∗∗ 20.505∗∗∗ 20.956∗∗∗
(0.995) (1.022) (1.025) (1.386) (1.446)
Age of child = 3 28.177∗∗∗ 28.234∗∗∗ 28.262∗∗∗ 27.191∗∗∗ 28.811∗∗∗
(1.166) (1.251) (1.253) (1.593) (1.747)
Age of child = 4 34.980∗∗∗ 35.648∗∗∗ 35.664∗∗∗ 35.130∗∗∗ 34.672∗∗∗
(1.144) (1.244) (1.254) (1.507) (1.760)
Age of child = 5 41.801∗∗∗ 41.711∗∗∗ 41.763∗∗∗ 38.857∗∗∗ 43.891∗∗∗
(1.441) (1.499) (1.509) (1.735) (2.215)
Age of mother at birth 0.050∗ 0.069 0.069 0.086∗∗ 0.025
(0.030) (0.058) (0.057) (0.042) (0.040)
Female -1.503∗∗∗ -1.666∗∗∗ -1.663∗∗∗
(0.414) (0.440) (0.441)
Mother married at birth 0.304 0.332
(1.201) (1.222)
Primary level of education -0.389 -0.426
(0.757) (0.765)
Secondary level of education 0.059 0.032
(1.265) (1.270)
Wealth score 0.202 0.200
(0.158) (0.175)
Birth order -0.107 -0.129
(0.202) (0.208)
Total value of crop production (10 quantiles) -0.028
(0.113)
Total expenditure of HH (10 quantiles) -0.015
(0.182)
Total expenditure on children (10 quantiles) 0.074
(0.188)
Constant 56.358∗∗∗ 57.602∗∗∗ 57.455∗∗∗ 57.569∗∗∗ 54.092∗∗∗
(1.541) (2.401) (2.521) (2.358) (2.090)
Observations 789 639 639 372 417
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Effects of
negative economic shocks during the year of birth on height. Columns 1, 2 and 3 include set of controls 1, 2 and 3,
respectively. Columns 4 and 5 include the same controls as Column 1. The reference category is a boy of age 0 from
the central region of Malawi who did not experience any economic shock at birth.
contextualize them.
4.2.2 Social transfers as informal safety net
There is a growing literature that demonstrates that the negative effects of in utero or early
exposure to stress and adversity can be mitigated by parental compensating or reinforcing in-
vestments (Adhvaryu et al. 2018, Adhvaryu and Nyshadham 2016, Almond and Mazumder 2013,
Bharadwaj et al. 2018, Sievertsen and Wüst 2017). In Malawi, potential mitigation effects would
be most likely to come from informal safety nets (Devereux 1999, Orr et al. 2001)14. Because
14It has been found that subsistence oriented agrarian societies have complex web of support networks that
help its more vulnerable members to protect themselves against risks and shocks (Scott 1977). Devereux (1999)
shows that transfer can contribute to as much as 14 percentage of total income in household in rural Malawi. He
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of the relatively poor public service and lack of financial resources, individuals in economic and
financial difficulties in Sub-Saharan countries like Malawi often rely on informal safety nets,
drawing on support from extended family, friends and other people in the community (Dev-
ereux 1999, Ellis et al. 2003, Orr et al. 2001).In my context, mothers who experience a negative
economic shock during pregnancy or shortly after giving birth could seek out for help among
persons in her village or community. To investigate whether informal transfers can attenuate the
effects of negative economic shocks on child health, I categorize mothers whose informal financial
and in-kind transfers, measured in the number of persons they have received transfers from at
the time of the interview, are under the median value in one group and the rest in an other. I
then regress child health on my economic shock variable using these two different samples and
compare the coefficients.
Table 6 show that mothers who received financial and in-kind transfers from their social
network were able to buffer the negative effects of economic shocks on both the weight and
height of their children. On the other hand, children who experienced an economic shock at
birth and whose mothers received transfers from no or relatively few people where about 600
grams lighter and 1.8 centimeters shorter than others. These effects are very large and show
how important informal safety nets can be in settings with relatively poor public service and
weak social welfare system15.
4.2.3 Additional robustness checks
It has been shown that the exact period in early life during which a negative economic shock
occurs matter for child development, with the year of birth being the period that is particularly
critical for child development (Maccini and Yang 2009). To test this hypothesis, I follow Maccini
and Yang (2009) and assess whether experiencing a negative economic shock one year before or
one year after the year of birth leads to the same effects as experiencing a similar shock during
the year of birth. By including these three dummy variables for the occurrence of shocks in the
same regression, I can rule out the possibility that the negative effects estimated thus far are
due to serially correlated shocks that happened prior or after the year of birth.
Table F.1 in the Online Appendix F shows the results of my estimations. Results for weight
suggests that the value of transfers can be much higher if one includes in kind transfers such as food, fertilizers,
clothes and unremunerated labour and childcare.
15Using the same proxies for informal safety net but measured in 2006 instead of 2008 to partially deal with
potential endogeneity issues shows similar patterns. More specifically, having a network from which mothers have
received help buffers the negative effects of economic shocks (see Table E.1 in the Online Appendix E).
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Table 6: Effects of negative economic shocks on objective mea-
sures of health, splitting the sample by whether the mothers
have received more or less transfers than the median value
Financial and in-kind transfers received
Weight Height
Below Above Below Above
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Set of controls 1 -0.569∗∗ -0.167 -1.628∗∗ -0.040
(0.254) (0.219) (0.796) (0.740)
Set of controls 2 -0.585∗∗ -0.197 -1.851∗∗ 0.642
(0.286) (0.221) (0.894) (0.789)
Set of controls 3 -0.600∗∗ -0.216 -1.978∗∗ 0.692
(0.294) (0.219) (0.888) (0.782)
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses,
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. I split my sample by whether
respondents have received informal transfers, be they financial or
in-kind, from fewer (Columns 1 and 3) or more (Columns 2 and 4)
persons than the median value in my sample.
show that, while experiencing a negative economic shocks irrespective of when it occurs does
have a negative effect on weight, it is only for those shocks that occur during the year of birth
that have large and statistically significant effects on weight. Results for height show again that
only economic shocks experienced during the year of birth affect height negatively. Again, these
effects are not precisely estimated and it is hard to see any conclusive evidence in these results
in the case of height.
Additionally, one concern in my analysis is that negative economic shocks during the year
of birth could have an effect on child mortality. If that is the case, then my results above could
potentially underestimate the true effects of these shocks on child health, as there would be a
selection into life, leaving only "healthy" and "strong" children in my sample. Fortunately, the
MLSFH allows me to test this hypothesis by tracing back the death of all the children of the
female respondents that were born between 2003 and 2008. I can therefore investigate whether
negative economic shocks at birth increased the probability of children dying by 2008. For this
analysis, my sample consists of 1939 children that were born between 2003 and 2008, out of
which 131 died by the time of the interview in 2008 (mortality rate of about 6.8%). Results in
Table G.1 of the Online Appendix G show that negative economic shocks at birth do not have
any effects on mortality, irrespective of whether shocks have affected only the household of the
respondent (idiosyncratic shocks) or other households as well (common shocks)16. My results
therefore seem not to be biased due to mortality selection17.
16These effects are estimated separately for each type of shocks.
17The under-5 mortality rate (U5MR) prevailing in Malawi in 2008 is equal to 9.8% (The World Bank 2008).
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The results above represent the effects of negative economics shocks experienced in utero or
during the year of birth on child health, assuming that these self-reported economic shocks are
exogenous and correctly reported. I now scrutinize these two assumptions a little further.
5 The effects of community level shocks
Assuming that the economic shocks are correctly reported, estimating their causal effects on
child health relies on the assumption that these shocks are exogenous, that is, uncorrelated
with the error term of the statistical model. This assumption may not hold if unobserved (and
uncontrolled for) characteristics of the mothers have an effect on the probability of experiencing
negative economic shocks and on child health. Among the economic shocks considered in the
economic shock module of the MLSFH, "death or serious illness of an household member", "loss
of source of income", "breakup of household" and "damage to house due to fire, flood etc" are
perhaps the ones that are most susceptible to being endogenous because they may be affected
by the mother's or household's unobserved behaviors and characteristics. On the other hand, in
addition to being the most common sources of economic shocks, "Poor crop yields, or loss due
to disease/pests"18 and "big change in price of grain"19 are plausibly more exogenous. These
shocks, sometimes called covariate shocks in the literature (Pradhan and Mukherjee 2018), have
the potential to affect not only the household of the respondents but the community as a whole.
To strengthen the causal interpretation of my results, I therefore use to occurrence of these
two exogenous shocks to create a new negative economic shock dummy, which I call "covariate
shock", that takes the value 1 if one or both of these shocks were experienced by the mothers
at childbirth and 0 otherwise.
Moreover, one of the strengths of the economic shock module in the MLSFH is that it also
It is therefore possible that infant deaths are underreported in my sample and that the estimated effects of
economic shocks on mortality reported in Table G.1 are biased towards 0.
18In the questionnaire, the shock is described as "Poor crop yields, loss of crops due to disease or pests, or
loss of livestock due to theft or disease, or loss of coupon". Droughts, pests and diseases are the most damaging
factors affecting crop production in Malawi (Giertz et al. 2015). While some of the underlying reasons for this
negative shock could potentially be due to individual behaviors, such as agricultural practices and mitigation
activities, it is however likely that the occurrences of this shock is independent to individuals characteristics
in my context. Lack of rainfall and presence of pests and diseases, themselves exacerbated by adverse weather
events, are likely to be beyond individual's control. In addition, the use of pesticides and storage tools among
smallholder farmers in Malawi is low because of their prices and unavailability in local markets (Maonga and
Maharjan 2004). Farmers therefore have to rely on traditional methods that, although reliable, are very limited
as compared to more modern techniques.
19The vast majority of the people living in rural Malawi owns small amount of farmland (Maonga and Maharjan
2004) and are therefore unlikely to have any influence on market prices. Volatility in the price of maize, the most
important staple crop in Malawi, results from environmental factors, unpredictable domestic market interventions
and export policies (Giertz et al. 2015).
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asks respondents to report whether the shocks have also affected other households in the com-
munity. Specifically, respondents are asked whether the shocks they report have affected their
"own household only", "other households as well", "most households in the community" or "all
households in the community". I can thus also exploit this information and restrict my two
most plausibly exogenous shocks to only those that have affected both the respondent's house-
holds and other households in the community. This reinforces the credibility of the exogeneity
assumption of the shocks I am using in my analysis.
Table 7 presents the results of regressing weight (first panel) and height (second panel) on
the occurrence of covariate shocks at birth by differentiating the degree of the effects that these
shocks have on the local community. The estimates in this table are derived using set of controls
1 in the econometric specification20. Columns 1 shows the effects of the covariate shock dummy
that combines both poor crop yields and big changes in price of grain and Column 2 presents the
results when these two shocks are considered separately but in the same regression. The results
in these two columns include shocks that have affected only the household of the respondents.
One can see in Column 1 that when I restrict my analysis to covariate shocks, the effect on
height is larger (about 1 centimeter decrease) and the effect on weight is roughly similar. The
two coefficients estimated fail to be significant at conventional levels. When considering these
two shocks separately but in the same regression in Column 2, one can see that big changes
in price of grain have the most detrimental effects on weight and height, with a reduction of
about 400 grams on weight and 1 centimeter on height. The effect on weight is significant at
90% confidence. Columns 3 and 4 show the results of similar estimations but when shocks
that have affected only the household of the respondents are excluded in the analysis. One can
see that considering only shocks that have affected both the respondents' household and other
households results in a strong effect on height, with a decrease of about 1.4 centimeters. This
effect is statistically significant at 95%. The effect on weight is in the ballpark of what I obtain
in my benchmark analysis, although it fails to be precisely estimated. When these shocks are
considered separately (Column 4), I again find that big changes in price of grain matter the
most, with a significant effect of about 520 grams on weight. Finally, I restrict my analysis
to shocks that have affected at least most households in the community in Columns 5 and 6.
Again, the idea is that these shocks are unlikely to be driven by mothers or households behaviors
20Corresponding analyses using the two other sets of control variables are included in the Online Appendix H
Tables H.1 and H.2.
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Table 7: Effects of covariate shocks on objective health outcomes for various levels of negative economic shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Weight
Covariate shocks -.257 -.216 -.305
(.191) (.221) (.257)
Poor crop yields,loss of crops due to disease or pests .107 .218 -.169
(.225) (.271) (.355)
Big change in price of grain -.445∗ -.520∗ -.246
(.245) (.275) (.299)
2. Height
Covariate shocks -.959 -1.421∗∗ -1.357∗
(.605) (.672) (.772)
Poor crop yields, loss of crops due to disease or pests -.377 -.797 -1.363
(.673) (.774) (1.126)
Big change in price of grain -1.018 -1.086 -0.713
(0.808) (0.901) (0.916)
Including shocks affecting only HH y y
Excluding shocks affecting only HH y y
Including only shocks affecting most or all HH in community only y y
Obs. 789 789 789 789 789 789
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. These regressions include set of controls
1. Covariate shock is a dummy variable that combines shocks due to poor crop yields/disease/pest and those due to big changes in price of
grain. Columns 1 and 2 include shocks affecting all households, including those that have affected only the household of the respondents.
Columns 3 and 4 exclude shocks that have affected only the household of the respondents. Columns 5 and 6 take into account only shocks that
have affected most or all households in the community.
and can therefore be considered as exogenous. The results I derive from these estimations in
Columns 5 and 6 are close to the ones in Columns 3 and 4. More specifically, I again find that
these covariate shocks, when considered together, have a large and somewhat precisely estimated
effect on height of about 1.4 centimeters. The effect on weight is in line with my benchmark
results although it fails once again to be statistically significant.
In sum, when I restrict my analysis to shocks that are more plausibly exogenous and that have
affected other households in the community as well, I obtain large and statistically significant
negative effects of these shocks on height of about 1.4 centimeters. The effect on weight is a
bit smaller and less precisely estimated but still roughly similar to the effects estimated in my
benchmark analysis. These results suggest that when the community as a whole is hit by a
shock, mothers cannot rely on informal safety nets to cope with economic difficulties.
6 Self-reported shock bias
One of the concerns in my analysis is that economic shocks are self-reported. In other contexts,
it has been found that misreporting may be systematically related to observed and unobserved
characteristics of individuals (Meyer and Mittag 2018, Meyer et al. 2018). It is therefore possible
that my shock variable may suffer from reporting errors due to false positive and false negative
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reported shocks. One issue for instance is that respondents are asked to recall economic shocks
that have occurred as far as five years prior to the interview. Although unexpected events or
crises are not easily forgotten, those who recall having experienced negative economic shocks over
the last previous five years might be very different from those who do not21. Other reasons often
given to explain misreporting are social desirability and essential survey condition or survey
design such as the survey mode and method (Meyer et al. 2018). Some respondents might
therefore report having experienced a negative economic shock in a given year even if it did not
occur case of false positive while others might not report a shock even if it did occur case of
false negative. For these reasons, errors in self-reported shocks might bias my estimates.
As noted in Section 3, the structural equation I am interested in estimating is the following:
Hi = α1S∗i +X ′iα2 + νi (2)
where S∗i represents the true shock dummy variable experienced by the respondents and νi ⊥
Xi, S
∗
i . A concern might be that the shock I observe in my data, Si, does not correspond to
the vector of real shocks S∗i . This difference may stem from both observed and unobserved
characteristics of the individuals. In this section, I assess whether my estimates are likely to be
robust to such misreporting. I show that, unlike in the case of classical measurement error in
which attenuation bias can be expected, endogenous misreporting may lead to attenuation or
expansion bias, and potentially generate estimates that have the opposite sign of the true effect,
a result that is discussed in greater detail by Kreider (2010), Kreider et al. (2012) and Nguimkeu
et al. (2017).
Assuming that the occurrence of real economic shocks is exogenous, I can suppose that S∗i
follows a Bernoulli distribution with parameter p, S∗ ∼ Bern (p).
S∗i =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if p
0 if 1 − p (3)
I assume that the researcher observes the reported shock Si with Si = di,S∗ + S∗i where I define
21Evidence is rather inconclusive in that regard as it has been found that longer recall period does not
necessarily lead to more errors (Meyer et al. 2018). Bound et al. (2001) suggest that it is the complexity of
a given experience over time rather than the passage of time that is related to misreporting, with salient and
frequent events more easily remembered than irregular events.
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di,S∗ as:
di,S∗ = 1(y∗i ⩾ n ∩ S∗i = 0) − 1(y∗i ⩽m ∩ S∗i = 1) (4)
with 1(.) is the indicator function. Essentially, di,S∗ is a function that introduces misreporting in
my model. The continuous latent variable y∗ represents the ability/willingness of the respondents
to correctly report the economic shocks they experienced in a given year. More specifically, false
positive cases arise (S∗i = 0 and di,S∗ = 1 such that Si = 1) when y∗ is larger or equal to a
certain cutoff n, with n > 0, which represents the threshold that determines the proportion of
false positive reports in my sample. Similarly, a false negative report, which is characterized by
S∗i = 1 and di,S∗ = −1 such that Si = 0, occurs when y∗ ⩽ m, with m < 0, m representing the
cutoff that determines the rate of false negative reports.
I define y∗i with a linear function as:
y∗i = w′iγ + ui (5)
with ui ∼ N (0,1) and wi a vector of observable individual reporting characteristics that deter-
mines respondents' likelihood to falsely report economic shocks.
To go back to my original equation, the researcher estimates:
Hi = α1Si +X ′iα2 + i (6)
where I plugged in S∗i = Si − di,S∗ . This means that i = νi + (S∗i − Si)α1 = νi − α1di,S∗ . Clearly,
the OLS estimator is biased if E(i∣X,S) = E(νi − α1di,S∗ ∣X,S) ≠ 0.
In the case where there is no misreporting, then the OLS estimator will be unbiased. This
can be seen by setting S = S∗ such that di,S∗ = 0 and thus E(νi − α1di,S∗ ∣X,S) = E(νi∣X,S) =
E(νi∣X,S∗) = 0 by assumption.
If there is misreporting and it is exogenous in the sense that the factors that explain mis-
reporting are not correlated with the unobservable variable in the structural equation, that is
corr(y∗i , νi) = 0 with E(νi∣X,S∗) = 0, then E(νi −di,S∗α1∣X,S) = E(νi∣X,S)−α1E(di,S∗ ∣X,S) =−α1E(di,S∗ ∣X,S). The measurement error in the independent variable is part of the error term,
which creates a bias. Like in the classical measurement error, one can see that in case of exoge-
nous misreporting, the bias will attenuate the OLS estimator. Indeed, given that di,S∗ and S
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are positively correlated, and that the true α1 is negative by assumption, then there is αˆ1 > α1,
that is, there exists an attenuation bias in this case.
Misreporting is endogenous when corr(y∗i , νi) ≠ 0, that is when the reporting characteristics
of individuals, observable or not, are correlated with variables that are uncontrolled for in Eq.
1 and that explain both Hi and Si. Indeed, when corr(y∗i , νi) ≠ 0, then E(νi∣Si) ≠ 0 because
of y∗i . In that case, the estimates that results from regressing Hi on Si will be biased. I show
in the Online Appendix I that the asymptotic bias in case of endogenous misreporting can be
written as:
plim(αˆ − α) = Γ − αΛ
Θ
(7)
where the direction of the bias is determined by the sign of the numerator. As shown in Nguimkeu
et al. (2017) and detailed in the Online Appendix, both attenuation bias and expansion bias can
occur. There can even be cases where the OLS estimates can have the wrong sign.
I provide two ways to empirically address the issue of misreporting. The first approach,
which is a more heuristic one, relies on restricting my sample to mothers with similar reporting
characteristics. The second approach exploits the structure of the model above and attempts to
identify the respondents who are the most likely to falsely report negative economic shocks by
trying to predict y∗i .
The first technique I put in place to address this issue of self-reported shocks is to include in
my sample respondents with the same unobserved "reporting" characteristics. Intuitively, it is
possible that mothers who report no shocks at all between 2003 and 2008 are different from those
who report 7 shocks (the maximum number) in the same period, not only in terms of observed
characteristics xi, but also in terms of uncontrolled reporting characteristics y∗i . To control
for these reporting characteristics, I follow Currie et al. (2018) and restrict my study sample
to mothers who report a given number of shocks between 2003 and 2008, thereby including in
sample only mothers with the same reporting patterns.
More specifically, I define as B the set of observations that are included in my analysis. So
far, B was composed of all the mothers in MLSFH who gave birth between 2003 and 2008,
irrespective of their number of shocks reported, that is:
B1 = {i ∶ 1[0 ⩽ ∣smi ∣ ⩽ 7] = 1} (8)
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where B1 is the set of observations included in my analysis and smi the number of shocks reported
by the mother m of child i between 2003 and 2008. In my benchmark sample, I included in B1
mothers who reported 0 to 7 shocks. The idea is now to sequentially restrict my study sample to
mothers with similar number of shocks reported, such that their reporting style becomes more
and more similar as the restriction becomes more binding. I therefore define others Bi with
i = {2,3,4,5} as
B2 = {i ∶ 1[1 ⩽ ∣smi ∣ ⩽ 7] = 1} (9)
B3 = {i ∶ 1[1 ⩽ ∣smi ∣ ⩽ 4] = 1} (10)
B4 = {i ∶ 1[2 ⩽ ∣smi ∣ ⩽ 7] = 1} (11)
B5 = {i ∶ 1[2 ⩽ ∣smi ∣ ⩽ 4] = 1} (12)
B2 restricts my study sample to mothers who reported over the period 2003-2008 between 1 and
7 shocks whereas B3 restricts it to mothers who reported between 1 and 4 shocks. Compared
to B2, B4 increases the lower bound to at least 2 and B5 restricts the analysis to mothers
who reported between 2 and 4 economic shocks from 2003 to 2008. My analysis thus relies
on the assumption that mothers who experience similar number of reported shocks between
2003 and 2008 but not during the years they have given birth serve as an appropriate control
group to mothers who did experience negative economic shocks the year of childbirth22. In
terms of the model above, these restrictions drop observations with extreme values of y∗i so that
1(w′iγ + ui ⩾ n) and 1(w′iγ + ui ⩽ m) never occur; that is, I restrict my set of mothers to those
who have reporting characteristics m ⩽ y∗i ⩽ n, whatever the value of S∗ is, which guarantees
that S = S∗.
Table 8 reports the results of this analysis using set of controls 123. Column 1 shows the
results including all i ∈ {B1}, which are the results in my benchmark specification in Columns 1
of Tables 4 and 5. Column 2 includes i ∈ {B2}. Discarding in my analysis the 31 children whose
mothers have not reported any shocks between 2003 and 2008 does not affect my estimates.
Further restricting my sample to mothers in B3 leads to an increase of the detrimental effects of
22One possible limitation of this analysis is that mothers who did not experience a negative economic shock at
childbirth actually experienced that extra shock after childbirth and not before it. And because economic shocks
after birth are more likely to have negative impacts on child health than shocks occurring prior to the year of
birth, the results I get from this analysis are likely to underestimate the true difference in child health between
children who did and those who did not experience a shock at birth.
23Results are similar when using set of controls 2 and 3. Table J.1 in the Online Appendix J presents these
results.
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Table 8: Effects of negative economic shocks on objective
measures of health using various set of mothers
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Weight -.336∗∗ -.323∗∗ -.357∗∗ -.307∗ -.352∗
(.164) (.164) (.167) (.184) (.187)
Height -.705 -.788 -.916∗ -.842 -.997∗
(.539) (.536) (.540) (.593) (.598)
Obs. 789 758 725 621 588
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in paren-
theses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The results are
derived using the set of controls 1. B1 corresponds to my
benchmark sample. B2 restricts my sample to mothers who
experienced at least one shock between 2003 and 2008. B3
includes mothers who have experienced at least one shock
but less than 5 and B4 restricts my analysis to mothers who
experienced at least 2 shocks. B5 includes only mothers who
reported between 2 and 4 negative shocks between 2003 and 2008.
economic shocks on weight and height from about 330 to 360 grams and 0.7 to 0.9 centimeters.
Unlike previous results, the latter effect is now statistically significant at 90% confidence. Finally,
when I restrict my sample to children whose mothers have reported at least 2 shocks to a
maximum of 7 shocks (B4, Column 4) and 4 shocks (B5, Column 5), one can see that the
estimates barely change. This analysis suggests that my results are robust to different reporting
patterns and that self-report bias might be relatively modest in my setting.
The strategy above relies on the assumption that by restricting my sample to mothers who
report similar numbers of shocks between 2003 and 2008, I am effectively able to ensure that
they have identical reporting styles. This presumably allows to control for reporting patterns
and therefore isolate the effects of negative economic shocks on children who experienced a
shock at birth relative to those who did not. Another approach to assess whether my results are
robust to misreporting is to explicitly model misreporting by allowing observed and unobserved
characteristics of the mothers to explain true and false (positive and negative) reports24. The
model below attempts to give some insights on the effect of endogenous misreporting and its
consequences on the OLS estimator.
24The model that follows is a mix between Nguimkeu et al. (2017), who allow false negative reports in their
model (one sided model) and Kreider (2010) who estimates conservative lower bounds of the OLS estimates by
allowing small fractions of self-reports to be in error.
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More specifically, the way I proceed to correct for endogenous misreporting bias is to change
the reporting status of mothers with "unusual" reporting patterns, in the sense that w′iγ+ui ⩽m
and w′iγ + ui ⩾ n25. This is similar in spirit to Kreider (2010) who identified conservative
bounds estimates by changing the reporting status of respondents of the same particular type
by hypothetically assuming the knowledge of their misreporting.
Given the assumptions of the model, I can write the probability of reporting or not reporting
a shock as:
P (Si = 1) = P (S∗i = 1 ∩w′iγ + ui >m) + P (S∗i = 0 ∩w′iγ + ui ⩾ n) (13)
P (Si = 0) = P (S∗i = 0 ∩w′iγ + ui < n) + P (S∗i = 1 ∩w′iγ + ui ⩽m) (14)
Because I assume that S∗i ⊥ ui and S∗ ∼ Bern (p), I can represent the above expressions as:
P (Si = 1) = p(1 −Φ(m −w′iγ)) + (1 − p)(1 −Φ(n −w′iγ)) = Pi(p, γ ∶m,n) (15)
P (Si = 0) = (1 − p)Φ(n −w′iγ) + pΦ(m −w′iγ) = 1 − Pi(p, γ ∶m,n) (16)
where I assume that ui follows a standard normal distribution, i.e., Φ(.) is the cumulative
distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
The likelihood function of this model is therefore:
ln(p, γ ∶m,n) = N∏
i=1Pi(p, γ ∶m,n)Si (1 − Pi(p, γ ∶m,n)1−Si (17)
from which I can derive the log-likelihood function:
Ln(p, γ ∶m,n) = ln(ln(p, γ ∶m,n)) = N∑
i=1Si lnPi(p, γ ∶m,n) + (1 − Si) ln(1 − Pi(p, γ ∶m,n))
(18)
From this expression, I can estimate the probability of truly experiencing an economic shock p,
that I denote by pˆ. pˆ represents the value that maximizes the likelihood of observing the vector S
while allowing for a proportion of false negative (m) and false positive (n) reports in the reported
negative economic shocks. I choose values of m and n so as to allow for 0, 1, 2, 5 and 10% of
false positive reports and 0, 2, 5, 10 and 20% of false negative reports, as false negative reporting
25One way to assess the robustness of my findings to exogenous misreporting would be to randomly select
observations in my sample and change their shock status.
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is usually more likely than false positive report (Meyer et al. 2018, Nguimkeu et al. 2017)26. The
variables in the vector w are variables for which the extreme values predict the respondent's
untruthful reporting. The upper tail of the y∗ distribution should reflect individuals who falsely
report the occurrence of negative economic shocks when none have occurred and the lower
tail represents individuals with false negative reports, that is individuals who did experience
economic shocks but report that they did not.
The first variable I include in w is the difference between the average number of shocks per
interview reported by the respondent's interviewer and the average number of shocks reported
by all the other interviewers. The idea is that interviewers have an effect on the reporting
pattern of the respondents and any deviation from the average might be due to false positive
or false negative reports. For instance, an interviewer whose respondents report on average a
higher number of shocks per interview than other interviewers is more likely to have some of
his or her respondents report shocks that did not occur (false positive). On the other hand,
a very low average rate of reported shocks per interview for a given interviewer compared to
others is correlated with the probability of the interviewer's respondents falsely reporting the
nonoccurrence of a shock (false negative)27.
The second variable I include in the vector w is the number of "Don't know" and "Can't
remember" responses the respondents have used to answer the questions from all the modules
in the survey. The rationale behind this variable is that individuals with many of such answers
are more likely to not report a shock that did occur (false negative) than respondents with fewer
"Don't know" and "Can't remember" answers. On the other hand, respondents with few of such
answers are more likely to report shocks even though they did not occur (false positive).
The same idea applies to my third variable that exploits a question at the very end of
the survey that asks the interviewers to evaluate the degree of cooperation of the respondent
during the interview as compared to other respondents, on a scale of 1 ("Bad") to 4 ("Very
good"). Respondents with a high level of cooperation are assumed to be more likely to report
false positive shocks while the opposite is true for those with a low degree of cooperation. I
standardize these three variables to put them on the same scale and to guarantee that yˆ∗ follows
a distribution that is close to N (0,1).
26Note that in the case of no false negative reports, I have m = −∞ such that P (Si = 0) = (1 − p)Φ(n −w′iγ).
In the case of no false positive reports, n = +∞ and P (Si = 1) = p(1 −Φ(m −w′iγ)). The case where there is no
false positive nor false negative reports corresponds to the benchmark case.
27It is worth noting that interviewers were randomly allocated to respondents.
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The strategy to account for misreporting in my estimation is to change the shock status of
those who are the most likely to false negatively or false positively report a shock. To do so, after
estimating pˆ from the maximum likelihood function above, I compute the number of individuals
for which I have to change the shock status, Ri,j with i = {0,2,5,10,20} corresponding to the
rate of false negative and j = {0,1,2,5,10} the rate of false positive reports, such that the new
vector S, that I denote by S′, has a rate of shocks equal to pˆ with:
pˆ = NS′=1
N
= NS∗=1
N
(19)
Obviously, R0,0 = 0. For cases where there is no mix of false positive and false negative reports,
i.e., R0,. and R.,0, I compute R as:
R = ∣p − pˆ∣ ×N (20)
with N as the number of observations in my sample and p = NS=1N as the proportion of individuals
who self-reported experiencing a negative shock. I then change the shock status of the R.,0
individuals at the left tail of the yˆ∗ = w′iγˆ distribution if S = 0 (false negative), and change the
shock status of the R0,. individuals at the right tail of the yˆ∗ = w′iγˆ distribution if S = 1 (false
positive), starting in both cases from the most extreme values.
In cases where both false positive and false negative reports are present, i.e., when Ri,j with
i = {2,5,10,20} and j = {1,2,5,10}, I compute Ri,j as:
Ri,j =max(Ri,0,R0,j) +R′i,j (21)
with R′i,j = ∣p − pˆ∣ ×N for every pair of i and j, [2,5,10,20] × [1,2,5,10]. The reason I take the
max(.) is because the false positive and false negative reports cancel each other out in S′, so
that R′i,j does not reflect the real number of misreports28. By taking max(Ri,0,R0,j), I follow
a more conservative approach and make sure that the number of false reports is at least as big
as Ri,0 and R0,j for each corresponding i and j. I therefore change the shock status of at least
max(Ri,0,R0,j) individuals on both ends of the y∗ distribution. By adding R′i,j to the max(.)
function in Eq. 21, I make sure that after changing the shock status of these Ri,j individuals,
the newly created shock vector S′ equals S∗, i.e., pˆ = NS′=1N = NS∗=1N .
28If the number of false positive and false negative reports is identical, then pˆ = NS′=1
N
= NS=1
N
= p.
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Table K.1 in the Online Appendix K reports the estimates of p that I derive from my
maximum likelihood function using the three variables in w I described above29. Not surprisingly,
as the rate of false positive reporting increases (Columns), the probability of "truly" experiencing
an economic shocks decreases, whereas that same probability increases when the rate of false
negative report goes up (Rows). When both false positive and false negative reports occur, the
effects cancel each other out so that the pˆ estimated in the diagonal elements of the p-matrix
are close to the case where there is no misreporting (first cell in the p-matrix).
Panels A and B of Table 9 report OLS estimates of the effects of economic shocks on weight
and height, respectively, after changing the shock status of Ri,j respondents at the tails of yˆ∗
to take endogenous misreporting into account. The first cells of Panels A and B in Table 9 are
my benchmark estimates and corresponds to the case where there is no false positive and false
negative reports. When allowing for false positive reports (Columns) to be at maximum 5% and
false negative reports (Rows) to be at maximum 10%, one can see in Panel A that the effects of
S′ on weight are robust and fairly precisely estimated, with effects of economic shocks on weight
ranging from about 200 to 450 grams. However, when allowing for higher rates of false positive
and false positive reports, the negative effect of shocks disappears.
Similarly for my estimates of S′ on height in the second panel of Table 9: the effects of
negative economic shocks seem to be quite robust for low rates of false reports, with an effect
ranging from 0.2 to 0.7 centimeters. However, the negative effect disappears when allowing
higher rates of misreporting. Note that, as was the case in my benchmark specification, these
effects are not precisely estimated and fail to be statistically significant.
The estimates above use my first set of control variables as regressors in the OLS estimations.
Table K.2 for weight and Table K.3 for height in the Online Appendix K show that the results
above are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables in my econometric specification
(set of control variables 3), which reduces my sample of observations from 775 to 629.
Overall, my results on the negative effects of economic shocks at birth on weight and height
appear to be robust to misreporting as long as the rates of false positive and false negative reports
remain relatively low. It is worth noting that, unsurprisingly, the negative effects disappear when
these rates increase given the conservative approach that I put in place. Indeed, in the case where
I allow 10% of false positive and 20% of false negative reports, this amounts to changing the
29Note that the results below are derived using my first set of control variables and are based on a sample of
775 observations. The difference in the number of observations is due to missing information in the variables in
w.
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Table 9: Effects of S′i on weight and height
Rate of false positive
A. Effects of economic shocks on weight
0% 1% 2% 5% 10%
Rate of false negative
0% -0.3280∗∗ -0.3134∗ -0.3755∗∗ -0.2678 -0.2746
(0.1669) (0.1714) (0.1743) (0.1794) (0.1921)
2% -0.4188∗∗∗ -0.4535∗∗∗ -0.4850∗∗∗ -0.2555 0.0393
(0.1553) (0.1640) (0.1686) (0.1726) (0.1948)
5% -0.4427∗∗∗ -0.3960∗∗ -0.4341∗∗∗ -0.4177∗∗ -0.0500
(0.1552) (0.1632) (0.1672) (0.1738) (0.1987)
10% -0.3780∗∗ -0.1936 -0.2924∗ -0.3351∗∗ 0.0160
(0.1567) (0.1742) (0.1758) (0.1807) (0.1977)
20% -0.2333 -0.0014 0.0063 -0.0857 0.0236
(0.1548) (0.1713) (0.1737) (0.1770) (0.1807)
B. Effects of economic shocks on height
0% 1% 2% 5% 10%
Rate of false negative
0% -0.5222 -0.4377 -0.6545 -0.2969 -0.2469
(0.5404) (0.5360) (0.5439) (0.5570) (0.5760)
2% -0.7134 -0.3160 -0.4812 -0.1362 -0.0712
(0.4941) (0.5802) (0.5860) (0.5848) (0.6416)
5% -0.4828 -0.3478 -0.3894 -0.2513 0.0114
(0.5617) (0.5550) (0.5715) (0.5777) (0.6228)
10% -0.4258 -0.3168 -0.3389 -0.4354 -0.0112
(0.5503) (0.5356) (0.5422) (0.5610) (0.6013)
20% -0.2484 -0.1316 -0.0139 -0.0526 0.1001
(0.5258) (0.5161) (0.5155) (0.5382) (0.5644)
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Estimated effects
of S′ on weight (Panel A) and height (Panel B), allowing for different rates of false positive reports (Columns) and false
negative reports (Rows), using set of controls 1. The sample is based on 775 observations.
shock status of 75 children on the left tail of the y∗ distribution (from 0 to 1, that is false negative
reports) and 95 children on the right tail of the y∗ distribution (from 1 to 0, that is false positive
reports). Out of the 29.29% of children who experienced a shock at birth (first cell in Table
K.1), about 42% were therefore considered as not having experienced a shock while about 14%
of those who did not experience a shock were assumed to have experienced one. These changes
represent a significant amount of misreporting in the analysis, which explains the differences in
the results between the cases where I allow for low versus high rates of false positive and false
negative reports.
7 Discussion and conclusion
In this study, I estimate the effects of negative economic shocks during pregnancy or the year
of childbirth on child health in Malawi, a Sub-Saharan African country where poverty is deep
and wide. I show that negative economic shocks have effects on both subjective and objective
measures of child health. More specifically, I find that children who experience a negative
economic shock at birth are about 7 percentage points less likely to be reported to be in excellent
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health and 8 percentage points less likely to be reported to be in much better health than children
of the same sex and age in the same village by their mothers. I show that these effects are robust
to reporting heterogeneity and unobserved mother and household effects that are constant over
children from the same family. I also show that children who experience a shock at birth were
about 300 grams lighter and 0.4 centimeters shorter, although the latter effect fails to be precisely
estimated in some of my specifications. All these effects are particularly strong for boys.
I also explore the plausibility of the exogeneity of the economic shocks used in my analysis
and issues around the self-reporting of shocks. With regard to the exogeneity assumption, my
dataset allows me to identify shocks that were triggered exogenously independently of mothers'
characteristics and that affected the community as a whole. I show that taking into account
these covariate shocks leads to similar results.
With regards to the fact that shocks are self-reported, I propose a simple model that allows
to control for endogenous misreporting by identifying respondents who are likely to misreport. I
show that changing the shock status of those who are likely to misreport generate similar results,
as long as the rates of false positive and false negative reports are not too high.
My study sheds light on the consequences of negative economic shocks that mothers experi-
ence while pregnant or the year they give birth on child health. This constitutes further evidence
of the intergenerational transmission of poverty and inequality in developing countries (Bhalotra
and Rawlings 2013). These results also highlight the indirect consequences of economic insta-
bility on child health and malnutrition and draw further attention to the particular economic
vulnerability of families living in Malawi, and perhaps more broadly in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Indeed, I believe my findings speak not only to the Malawian context but also to Sub-Saharan
African countries in general. Malawi shares many socio-economic and socio-demographic char-
acteristics with its neighbouring countries (Chin 2010) and it is likely that negative economic
shocks have identical effects in settings that share similar fragility and vulnerability.
From a policy perspective, my results imply that economic shocks at a specific time in life can
have long-lasting effects and that families cannot rely on social network and informal safety nets
to protect themselves against shocks that affect the community as a whole. Policies aiming to
protect families with young children and particularly pregnant women against negative economic
shocks can help mitigate the deleterious consequences of these shocks, especially in terms of food
security and health care use. Given the substantial economic costs of undernutrition and the
now demonstrated dramatic benefits of investing in nutrition, where the return for every dollar
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invested can be up to 35 dollars (Shekar et al. 2017), guaranteeing food security to vulnerable
individuals to ensure their healthy development is not only the right thing to do, but it is also
a smart investment. This could improve the well-being of not only the mothers who are subject
to economic shocks but also their children who start their life with lower initial health capital.
This resonates well with the new direction that international organizations such as the World
Bank and the United Nations are taking, when placing human capital development, especially
early in life, at the center of their agendas (The World Bank Group 2018).
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ONLINE APPENDIX
Appendix A
Table A.1: Marginal effects of negative economic shocks at birth
on subjective health outcomes - Logit regressions
Effects of economic shocks at birth on:
Probability of being (1) (2) (3)
ill in the last 12 months 0.011 0.021 0.019
(0.029) (0.033) (0.032)
ill for more than 1 month 0.016 0.016 0.015
(0.013) (0.016) (0.015)
in very good health -0.016 -0.037 -0.036
( 0.025) (0.029) (0.029)
in excellent health -0.033 -0.070∗∗ -0.073∗∗
(0.028) (0.031) (0.031)
in better health -0.029 -0.058∗ -0.053∗
(0.027) (0.031) (0.031)
in much better health -0.034 -0.083∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.030) (0.030)
Obs. 1784 1382 1380
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Columns 1, 2 and 3 include set of
controls 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
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Table A.2: Marginal effects of negative economic shocks at birth
on subjective health outcomes - Probit regressions
Effects of economic shocks at birth on:
Probability of being (1) (2) (3)
ill in the last 12 months 0.011 0.021 0.019
(0.029) (0.032) (0.032)
ill for more than 1 month 0.015 0.015 0.014
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
in very good health -0.016 -0.036 -0.035
(0.025) (0.029) (0.029)
in excellent health -0.033 -0.070∗∗ -0.074∗∗
(0.027) (0.031) (0.031)
in better health -0.028 -0.057∗ -0.053∗
(0.027) (0.031) (0.031)
in much better health -0.033 -0.081∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.030) (0.030)
Obs. 1784 1382 1380
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Columns 1, 2 and 3 include set of
controls 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
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Appendix B
Table B.1: Estimates of the effects of negative economic
shocks on subjective health measures controlling for mother
fixed effects (linear)
Probability of being: (1) (2) (3)
ill in the last 12 months .003 .010 .009
(.039) (.050) (.050)
ill for more than 1 month .004 -.003 -.003
(.018) (.024) (.024)
in very good health -.042 -.028 -.028
(.031) (.045) (.045)
in excellent health -.042 -.099∗∗ -.103∗∗
(.029) (.040) (.040)
in better health -.009 -.012 -.012
(.034) (.049) (.049)
in much better health -.042 -.073∗∗ -.073∗∗
(.029) (.035) (.035)
Obs. 1203 769 767
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in paren-
theses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Effect of negative
economic shock during the year of birth on subjective health
outcomes controlling for mother fixed effects. Columns 1, 2 and
3 include set of controls 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Estimates of
the other coefficients are available upon request.
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Table B.2: Estimates of the effects (odd-ratios) of negative economic shocks on subjective health
measures controlling for mother fixed effects (logit)
Set of controls 1 Set of controls 2
Odd ratios Conf. Int. (95%) Odd ratios Conf. Int. (95%)
Probability of being: (1) (2) (3) (4)
ill in the last 12 months 1.003 [1.676-0.601] 0.821 [1.695-0.398]
Obs. 406 256
ill for more than 1 month 1.791 [7.288-0.440] n.a. n.a.
Obs. 107 .
in very good health 0.694 [1.290-0.373] 0.856 [1.821-0.403]
Obs. 277 190
in excellent health 0.613 [1.281-0.293] 0.323∗∗ [0.956-0.109]
Obs. 243 154
in better health 0.803 [1.339-0.481] 0.781 [1.507-0.405]
Obs. 318 212
in much better health 0.592 [1.217-0.405] 0.145∗∗ [0.668-0.032]
Obs. 226 137
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Effects
of negative economic shocks during the year of birth on subjective health outcomes controlling for mother
fixed-effect with a logit specification by means of conditional likelihood function. Columns 1 and 3 include set
of controls 1 and 2, respectively. The results using set of controls 3 are similar to the ones derived using set of
control 2 as there is no within-mother variation in the variables that are added to the model. Estimates of the
other coefficients are available upon request. There was not enough variation in the "Being ill for more than 1
month" specification for it to be estimated when using set of controls 2. Estimates presented are odd-ratios.
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Table C.1: Effects of negative economic shocks at birth on objective health outcomes using
different wealth scores
Weight Height
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Wealth measure 1
Economic shock at birth -0.336∗∗ -0.284∗ -0.316∗ -0.705 -0.587 -0.550
(0.164) (0.164) (0.166) (0.539) (0.548) (0.549)
Wealth score -0.130∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗ 0.208 0.156
(0.047) (0.049) (0.168) (0.176)
Obs. 789 769 768 789 769 768
2. Wealth measure 2
Economic shock at birth -0.336∗∗ -0.419∗ -0.473∗∗ -0.705 -1.278∗ -1.288∗
(0.164) (0.228) (0.231) (0.539) (0.700) (0.695)
Wealth score -0.136∗∗ -0.132∗∗ -0.019 -0.026
(0.064) (0.064) (0.154) (0.168)
Obs. 789 487 486 789 487 486
Note: Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01. Columns 1-3 represent the results for weight and Columns 4-6 for height. Wealth measure 1 is
the wealth of the household in 2004, subsequently changing missing values with the wealth level of the
household in 2006 and then in 2008. Wealth measure 2 only takes into account the household wealth
level in 2004, not exploiting the information from the 2006 and 2008 waves.
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Appendix D
Effects on weight-for-age and height-for-age z-scores
One can assess where in the weight and height distributions the effects of negative economic
shocks are taking place using z-scores. Assuming weight and height are normally distributed
in the population, I can estimate the effects of negative economic shocks on weight-for-age and
height-for-age z-scores, as defined as:
zi = mi −Ms,a
sds,a
(D.1)
wheremi is my objective anthropometric measure (weight or height) of child i,Ms,a is the median
and sds,a the standard deviation of m from i's reference group based on sex s and age a in my
sample. Weight-for-age and height-for-age z-scores are widely used anthropometric measures
and deficits in these measures are often seen as evidence of malnutrition (Fishman et al. 2004,
WHO 1995). As an indicator of thinness and wasting, low weight-for-age z-score implies recent
or continuing current severe weight loss and is the strongest anthropometric predictor of child
malnutrition and long-term mortality in developing countries used in the literature (Fishman
et al. 2004, WHO 1995). Low height-for-age reflects shortness and stunted growth, which is a
failure to reach optimal health potential. This is often characterized by early and long-term
exposure to adverse conditions due, for instance, to illness and malnutrition (De Onis et al.
1997, WHO 1995).
I derive binary variables that take the value 1 if the z-score in consideration is less than d and
0 otherwise, with d = {−2,−1,0,1,2}. Children with z-scores of weight-for-age and height-for-
age lower than −2 are categorized as suffering from moderate to severe undernutrition (De Onis
et al. 1997). More specifically, childhood stunting, a good indicator of children well-being and
malnutrition (De Onis and Branca 2016), corresponds to a height-for-age z-score below −2 (WHO
1995) and moderate to severe underweight corresponds to a weight-for-age z-score lower than−2. A weight-for-age z-score between −2 and −1 represents the case of children who are mildly
underweight (Fishman et al. 2004).
The first panel of Table D.1 reports the results of the effects of economic shocks experienced
by children on their weight-for-age z-score. Column 1 shows the effects of economic shock on the
z-score when considering the z-score as a continuous measure. The table shows that the weight
of the children who experienced a shock at birth is on average about 0.16 standard deviation
lower than the median weight.
When discretizing my continuous measures into categories, Column 2 shows that children
who experienced a shock at birth were 3 percentage points more likely to have a weight that is 2
standard deviations lower than others and this effect is statistically significant at the 10%-level30.
The same children were also about 10 percentage points more likely to be lower than median
weight and 3 percentage points more likely to have a weight that is less than +2 standard
deviations above the median. These effects are statistically significant at the 1%-level. This
shows that experiencing a negative economic shock at birth results in a shift towards the left
of the weight-for-age z-score distribution. The effect appears to be quite homogeneous along
the weight distribution, although the effects are stronger at the median and are statistically
significant only at both ends of the distribution and at the median.
The second panel of Table D.1 shows the results of the same regressions, but looking at
height instead of weight. Negative economic shocks in utero or during the year of birth appear
to have a negative effect on the height-for-age z-score (Column 1) and a positive effect on the
probability of having a z-score that is below the various z-score thresholds. These effects are
30As mentioned above, a weight-for-age z-score of −2 and below characterizes children as being underweight
(De Onis et al. 1997).
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Table D.1: Weight-for-age and height-for-age z-scores, assuming normal
distributions
Z-score <-2 <-1 <0 <1 <2
1. Weight
Set of controls 1 -.168∗∗ .028∗ .027 .088∗∗ .037 .025∗∗∗
(.084) (.016) (.030) (.045) (.030) (.010)
Set of controls 2 -.157∗ .031∗ .020 .105∗∗ .030 .026∗∗
(.090) (.017) (.032) (.048) (.032) (.012)
Set of controls 3 -.169∗ .031∗ .020 .108∗∗ .035 .027∗∗
(.091) (.017) (.032) (.048) (.032) (.012)
2. Height
Set of controls 1 -.124 .011 .049 .066 .046 -.007
(.091) (.014) (.032) (.045) (.033) (.015)
Set of controls 2 -.062 .010 .027 .022 .031 -.013
(.098) (.016) (.032) (.048) (.037) (.018)
Set of controls 3 -.061 .008 .027 .018 .033 -.012
(.099) (.016) (.032) (.048) (.037) (.018)
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Effects of negative economic shocks during the year of
birth on z-score (Column 1) and on dummy variables that take value 1 if z-score
is below d with d = {−2,−1,0,1,2}. The first panel looks at the effects on weight
and the second at the effects on height.
however not precisely estimated.
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Table E.1: Effects of negative economic shocks on objec-
tive measures of health, splitting the sample by whether
the mothers have received more or less transfers than the
median value in 2006
Financial and in-kind transfers received (in 2006)
Weight Height
Below Above Below Above
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Set of controls 1 -0.405 -0.215 -0.891 -0.040
(0.283) (0.238) (1.021) (0.670)
Set of controls 2 -0.440 -0.062 -0.557 0.228
(0.321) (0.226) (1.092) (0.677)
Set of controls 3 -0.448 -0.089 -0.595 0.206
(0.324) (0.224) (1.097) (0.672)
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in paren-
theses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. I split my sample
by whether respondents have received informal transfers, be
they financial or in-kind, from fewer (Columns 1 and 3) or
more (Columns 2 and 4) persons than the median value in my
sample (in 2006).
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Table F.1: Effects of economic shocks one year before, one year after
and during the year of birth on objective health measures
(1) (2) (3)
1. Weight
Economic shock a year before birth .171 -.026 -.031
(.213) (.222) (.221)
Economic shock at birth -.348∗ -.380∗ -.411∗∗
(.182) (.195) (.196)
Economic shock a year after birth -.115 -.139 -.154
(.168) (.185) (.188)
2. Height
Economic shock a year before birth .649 .685 .662
(.657) (.748) (.754)
Economic shock at birth -.792 -.424 -.438
(.569) (.634) (.639)
Economic shock a year after birth .331 .087 .066
(.520) (.581) (.580)
Obs. 645 524 524
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Columns 1, 2 and 3 include set of controls
1, 2 and 3, respectively. The first panel shows the effects of negative
economic shocks on weight for shocks that occur one year prior to birth
(row 1), during the year of birth (second row) and one year after the year
of birth (row 3). The second panel shows the results for height instead
of weight. The sample underlying this specification is smaller than in my
previous analyses because shocks reported in wave 5 of MLSFH cover only
the period from 2003 to 2008. I therefore don't know whether those born
in 2003 experienced a shock in 2002 and those born in 2008 experienced a
shock in 2009. I thus discard these observations and keep for this analysis
only children who are born between 2004 and 2007, leading to a reduced
sample size.
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Table G.1: Effects of economic shocks on mortality
Effects on mortality
(1) (2) (3)
Shock at birth .009 -.002 -.001
(.013) (.015) (.014)
Idiosyncratic shock at birth -.004 .001 .001
(.018) (.021) (.021)
Common shock at birth .020 .004 .005
(.016) (.017) (.016)
Obs. 1939 1510 1508
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in
parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Age of the
children is not controlled for in these regressions. Sample
consists of 1939 children, 1808 are alive and 131 are dead
(6.76%) in 2008. Idiosyncratic shocks are shocks affecting the
household of the respondents only. Common shocks are shocks
that affect other households as well, as defined in Table 2.
Regressions are conducted separately for each type of shocks
(rows).
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Table H.1: Effects of covariate shocks on objective health outcomes for various levels of negative economic shocks, including set
of controls 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Weight
Covariate shocks -.106 -.021 -.074
(.196) (.223) (.246)
Poor crop yields,loss of crops due to disease or pests .117 .198 -.179
(.238) (.280) (.351)
Big change in price of grain -.200 -.206 .070
(.239) (.266) (.265)
2. Height
Covariate shocks -.437 -.995 -1.073
(.639) (.714) (.812)
Poor crop yields, loss of crops due to disease or pests -.183 -.673 -1.159
(.702) (.813) (1.128)
Big change in price of grain -.453 -.566 -.463
(.852) (.944) (.978)
Including shocks affecting only HH y y
Excluding shocks affecting only HH y y
Including only shocks affecting most or all HH in community only y y
Obs. 639 639 639 639 6339 639
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. These regressions include set of
controls 2. Covariate shock is a dummy variable that combines shocks due to poor crop yields/disease/pest and those due to big changes
in price of grain. Columns 1 and 2 include shocks affecting all households, including those that have affected only the household of the
respondents. Columns 3 and 4 exclude shocks that have affected only the household of the respondents. Columns 5 and 6 take into
account only shocks that have affected most or all households in the community.
Table H.2: Effects of covariate shocks on objective health outcomes for various levels of negative economic shocks, including set
of controls 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Weight
Covariate shocks -.132 -.061 -.124
(.197) (.225) (.244)
Poor crop yields,loss of crops due to disease or pests .101 .155 -.259
(.237) (.279) (.345)
Big change in price of grain -.221 -.217 .067
(.238) (.268) (.261)
2. Height
Covariate shocks -.433 -1.009 -1.093
(.642) (.716) (.815)
Poor crop yields, loss of crops due to disease or pests -.184 -.700 -1.232
(.706) (.815) (1.139)
Big change in price of grain -.444 -.546 -.430
(.859) (.959) (.992)
Including shocks affecting only HH y y
Excluding shocks affecting only HH y y
Including only shocks affecting most or all HH in community only y y
Obs. 639 639 639 639 639 639
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. These regressions include set of
controls 3. Covariate shock is a dummy variable that combines shocks due to poor crop yields/disease/pest and those due to big changes
in price of grain. Columns 1 and 2 include shocks affecting all households, including those that have affected only the household of the
respondents. Columns 3 and 4 exclude shocks that have affected only the household of the respondents. Columns 5 and 6 take into
account only shocks that have affected most or all households in the community.
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The derivation of the asymptotic bias in case of endogenous misreporting follows closely Nguimkeu
et al. (2017) and the results they derive in their one-sided model. I know from Eq. 6 and the
Frisch-Waugh theorem that
MH = α1MS +M (I.1)
where I omit the subscript X on the projection matrix M for ease of notation (MX). It follows
that the OLS estimator of α1 is:
αˆ1 = (S′MS)−1S′MH (I.2)
where I use the idempotence of the projection matrix M and the fact that M = M ′. Plugging
in the expression for MH in Eq. I.2 and rearranging yields:
αˆ1 − α1 = (S′MS)−1S′M (I.3)
Taking the expectation, I then get:
E(αˆ1 − α1∣X,S) = (S′MS)−1S′ME(i∣X,S) ≠ 0 (I.4)
as explained above due to both E(νi∣X,S) ≠ 0 and −α1E(di,S∗ ∣X,S)) ≠ 0.
To determine the inconsistency of the OLS estimator, I can express the above expression as:
αˆ1 − α1 = (S′MS)−1S′M (I.5)
αˆ1 − α1 = (S′MS
N
)−1 S′M
N
(I.6)
αˆ1 − α1 = ( S′MS
N´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
1O
)−1( S′Mν
N´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
2O
− S′Mαd
N´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
3O
) (I.7)
I derive now each of the three terms on the right hand side of Eq. I.7, starting with 1O.
1O = S′MS
N
= S′[I −X(X ′X)−1X ′]S
N
= S′S
N
− S′X(X ′X)−1X ′S
N
(I.8)
which, following the Weak Law of Large Numbers and the Slutsky theorem, leads to
1O
p→ E(S2i ) −E(Six′i)E(xix′i)−1E(Sixi) (I.9)
and then, using the Continuous Mapping theorem, I know that:
1O−1 = (S′MS
N
)−1 p→ [E(S2i ) −E(Six′i)E(xix′i)−1E(Sixi)]−1 (I.10)
Similarly, 2O can be written as follows:
2O = S′Mν
N
p→ E(Siνi) −E(Six′i)E(xix′i)−1E(xiνi) = E(Siνi) (I.11)
where I use the fact that E(xiνi) = E(xi)E(νi) = 0. To define E(Siνi), I remember that
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Si = 1(w′iγ + ui ⩾ n ∩ S∗i = 0) − 1(w′iγ + ui ⩽m ∩ S∗i = 1) + S∗i so that:
E(Siνi) = E(νi1(w′iγ + ui ⩾ n ∩ S∗i = 0) − νi1(w′iγ + ui ⩽m ∩ S∗i = 1) + νiS∗i ) (I.12)= E((1 − p)Pr(ui ⩾ n −w′iγ)E(νi∣ui ⩾ n −w′iγ) − pPr(ui ⩽m −w′iγ)E(νi∣ui ⩽m −w′iγ))
(I.13)
where I use the exogeneity of S∗i , the law of iterated expectations and the fact that E(νi) = 0.
I assume (νiui) ∼ N(0,Σ) with Σ = ( σ2ν δσνσuδσνσu σ2u ) and corr(νi, ui) = δ. After some arrange-
ments, Eq. I.13 simplifies to:
E(Siνi) = E[(1 − p)δσνφ(n −w′iγ
σu
) + pδσνφ(m −w′iγ
σu
)] (I.14)
such that
2O = S′Mνi
N
p→ E(Siνi) = E[(1 − p)δσνφ(n −w′iγ
σu
) + pδσνφ(m −w′iγ
σu
)] (I.15)
Turning now to 3O, I have
3O = αS′Md
N
= αS′[I −X(X ′X)−1X ′]d
N
(I.16)
= αS′d
N
− αS′X(X ′X)−1X ′d
N
(I.17)
p→ αE(Sidi) − αE(Six′i)E(xix′i)−1E(dix′i) (I.18)
This leads to:
plim(αˆ − α) = E[(1 − p)δσνφ(n−w′iγσu ) + pδσνφ(m−w′iγσu )] − α[E(Sidi) −E(Six′i)E(xix′i)−1E(dix′i)]
E(S2i ) −E(Six′i)E(xix′i)−1E(Sixi)
(I.19)
In case of endogenous misreporting, both attenuation bias and expansion bias can occur. As
detailed below and discussed in Nguimkeu et al. (2017), there can even be cases where the OLS
estimates can have the wrong sign.
Because by assumption α is negative, attenuation bias exists when plim(αˆ − α) > 0 and
expansion bias exists when plim(αˆ − α) < 0. There are also cases where αˆ < 0 < α or αˆ > 0 > α,
that is, OLS estimates can have the wrong sign. To see this, rewrite Eq. I.19 as:
plim(αˆ − α) = Γ − αΛ
Θ
(I.20)
Because the denominator Θ is positive (by the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality), the direction of the
bias is determined by the sign of the numerator.
First, one can show that expansion (attenuation) bias occurs if ΓΛ < (>)α and Λ > (<)0 or
when Λ < (>)0 and ΓΛ > (<)α. One can also show that αˆ and α can have opposite signs. Again,
assuming that α < 0, then αˆ > 0 if Γ > 0 and 0 > α > ΓΛ−Θ with Θ−Λ > 0. In case Θ−Λ < 0, then
α will have to be smaller than ΓΛ−Θ for αˆ to have the opposite sign of α. It is worth noting that
these last conditions can be met in my setting. Recall that Γ = E(Siνi), such that Γ > 0 holds if
δ = corr(νi, ui) > 0. This can potentially be the case as unobserved factors in Eq. 1 that explain
poor health can be positively correlated with factors that explain misreporting behaviors31.
31It is interesting to note that the sign switching region basically depends on the size of Γ
Λ−Θ . One can show
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that ∂ζ
∂δ
> 0, ∂ζ
∂σ2
> 0, ∂ζ
∂m
> 0 and ∂ζ
∂n
< 0 with ζ = Γ
Λ−Θ .
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Appendix J
Table J.1: Effects of negative economic shocks on objective measures of
health using various sets of mothers and sets of control variables
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Set of controls 2
Weight -.325∗ -.301∗ -.342∗ -.264 -.320∗
(.173) (.173) (.176) (.190) (.193)
Height -.355 -.389 -.530 -.420 -.594
(.583) (.581) (.582) (.644) (.646)
Obs. 639 613 588 502 477
2. Set of controls 3
Weight -.353∗∗ -.324∗ -.370∗∗ -.295 -.358∗
(.175) (.174) (.176) (.190) (.192)
Height -.356 -.379 -.522 -.428 -.614
(.588) (.585) (.587) (.650) (.653)
Obs. 639 613 588 502 477
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The results are derived using the set of controls
2 (first panel) and 3 (second panel). B1 corresponds to my benchmark
sample. B2 restricts my sample to mothers who experienced at least one
shock between 2003 and 2008. B3 includes mothers who have experienced
at least one shock but less than 5 and B4 restricts my analysis to mothers
who experienced at least 2 shocks. B5 includes only mothers who reported
between 2 and 4 negative shocks between 2003 and 2008.
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Appendix K
Table K.1: Probabilities of experiencing negative economic shocks, allowing for misreporting
Rate of false positive
Estimates of the parameter p, pˆ 0% 1% 2% 5% 10%
Rate of false negative
0% 0.2929∗∗∗ 0.2629∗∗∗ 0.2545∗∗∗ 0.2333∗∗∗ 0.1964∗∗∗
(0.0163) (0.0181) (0.0183) (0.0185) (0.0186)
2% 0.3339∗∗∗ 0.2840∗∗∗ 0.2710∗∗∗ 0.2445∗∗∗ 0.2043∗∗∗
(0.0196) (0.0181) (0.0182) (0.0185) (0.0190)
5% 0.3430∗∗∗ 0.3013∗∗∗ 0.2873∗∗∗ 0.2580∗∗∗ 0.2145∗∗∗
(0.0202) (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0191) (0.0196)
10% 0.3569∗∗∗ 0.3237∗∗∗ 0.3097∗∗∗ 0.2787∗∗∗ 0.2314∗∗∗
(0.0209) (0.0197) (0.0198) (0.0201) (0.0209)
20% 0.3879∗∗∗ 0.3653∗∗∗ 0.3524∗∗∗ 0.3204∗∗∗ 0.2683∗∗∗
(0.0221) (0.0216) (0.0219) (0.0226) (0.0239)
Note: Estimated probabilities of experiencing a negative economic shock, allowing for different rates of false
positive reports (Columns) and false negative reports (Rows). These probabilities are estimated with maximum
likelihood using set of controls 1. The sample is based on 775 observations.
Table K.2: Effects of S′i on weight, including set of controls 3
Rate of false positive
Effects of economic shocks on weight
0% 1% 2% 5% 10%
Rate of false negative
0% -0.3703∗∗ -0.4788∗∗∗ -0.4350∗∗ -0.4278∗∗ -0.4435∗∗
(0.1771) (0.1790) (0.1817) (0.1877) (0.1904)
2% -0.4111∗∗ -0.4255∗∗ -0.4374∗∗ -0.4920∗∗ -0.1200
(0.1665) (0.1768) (0.1789) (0.1812) (0.2228)
5% -0.3879∗∗ -0.2557 -0.4266∗∗ -0.5297∗∗∗ -0.0848
(0.1676) (0.1932) (0.1755) (0.1794) (0.2137)
10% -0.2871∗ -0.2138 -0.2175 -0.3104 -0.0471
(0.1725) (0.1874) (0.1886) (0.1905) (0.2081)
20% -0.1467 0.0965 -0.0112 -0.0779 -0.2032
(0.1766) (0.1854) (0.1876) (0.1899) (0.1994)
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Estimated
effect of S′ on weight, allowing for different rates of false positive reports (Columns) and false negative reports (Rows),
using set of controls 3. The sample is based on 629 observations and the estimations include set of controls 3.
55
Table K.3: Effects of S′i on height, including set of controls 3
Rate of false positive
Effects of economic shocks on height
0% 1% 2% 5% 10%
Rate of false negative
0% -0.5222 -0.3135 -0.3625 -0.1762 -0.4306
(0.5404) (0.5458) (0.5469) (0.5590) (0.5769)
2% -0.4683 -0.2479 -0.3302 0.0995 0.1228
(0.5809) (0.5868) (0.5916) (0.5906) (0.6461)
5% -0.5093 -0.1431 -0.3413 -0.2778 0.3027
( 0.5675) (0.5628) (0.5745) (0.5777) (0.6264)
10% -0.3980 -0.1056 0.0220 -0.3276 0.2446
(0.5566) (0.5458) (0.5510) (0.5614) (0.6028)
20% -0.3061 -0.2847 -0.4790 -0.1342 0.2437
(0.5362) (0.5058) (0.5132) (0.5366) (0.5732)
Note: Clustered standard errors at the mother level in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Estimated effect of S′ on height, allowing for different rates of false positive reports (Columns) and
false negative reports (Rows), using set of controls 3. The sample is based on 629 observations and the
estimations include set of controls 3.
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